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	We	have	set	to	defend	the	reliability	of	introspection	against	the	skeptical	challenge	by	pointing	at	an	often	neglected	phenomenon,	thing-introspection,	and	showing	the	psychological	and	epistemic	consequences	of	our	account	of	it.	We	have	argued	that	thing-introspection	has	not	been	shown	to	be	unreliable,	and	may	even	be	infallible.	Our	defense	comprises	a	negative	component	and	a	positive	component.			 The	negative	component	addresses	skeptical	arguments	against	the	reliability	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	The	general	form	of	those	arguments	tends	to	be	this:	phenomenal	beliefs	are	ultimately	based	on	introspection;	introspection	is	unreliable;	therefore,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	unreliable.	We	have	argued	that	such	arguments	only	target	fact-introspection,	and	leave	the	question	of	the	reliability	thing-introspection	untouched.	If	error	occurs	in	fact-introspection,	then	it	is	more	likely	not	due	to	a	flaw	in	introspection	proper,	but	rather	to	miscategorization.		 The	positive	component	of	our	defense	is	grounded	in	a	certain	view	of	phenomenal	consciousness,	according	to	which	the	occurrence	of	a	conscious	experience	requires	the	subject’s	inbuilt,	constitutive	awareness	of	the	experience.	By	consequence,	our	positive	claim	is	a	conditional	one:	if	our	theoretical	framework	is	accepted,	then	thing-introspection	is	not	only	reliable,	but	quite	likely	infallible.	We	have	suggested	that	our	account	of	thing-introspection	allows	for	a	model	of	phenomenal-belief	formation	process	which	could	pave	the	way	for	a	defense	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	Arguably,	that	our	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	justified	is	an	article	of	common	sense.	To	that	extent,	it	is	a	strength	of	any	theory	of	belief	formation	that	it	vindicates	the	notion	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	typically	justified.		 It	must	be	pointed	out,	however,	that	our	discussion	does	not	quite	defeat	skeptical	arguments	about	phenomenal	beliefs.	For	we	have	only	argued	for	the	claim	that	thing-introspection	is	highly	reliable	(and	may	turn	out	to	be	infallible).	We	have	not	shown	that	the	attendant	categorizing	process	leading	from	thing-
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introspection	to	fact-introspection	and	the	phenomenal	belief	is	reliable.	Therefore,	we	have	not	demonstrated	that,	contrary	to	what	skeptics	argue,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	on	the	whole	justified.	Nevertheless,	the	proposed	model	of	phenomenal-belief	formation	process	might	lay	the	basis	for	a	more	developed	defense	of	the	reliability	of	phenomenal	beliefs.	We	hope	to	pursue	this	wider	project	in	future	work.		 Our	discussion	has	important	implications	for	both	psychology	and	epistemology.	Regarding	the	former,	since	the	demise	of	introspectionist	psychology	about	a	century	ago,	introspection	has	been	considered	illegitimate	in	psychological	inquiry.	And	appeal	to	introspection	does	raise	a	number	of	genuine	issues,	in	particular	as	concerns	replicability	and	peer	disagreement	(Watson	1913,	Bayne	and	Spener	2010).	If	we	are	right,	however,	then	modulo	these	issues,	at	the	core	of	introspection	is	a	phenomenon	which	is	fundamentally	trustworthy,	one	it	might	be	foolish	to	leave	entirely	unexploited.		 As	for	epistemology,	our	discussion	may	offer	new	support	for	a	certain	traditional	version	of	foundationalism.	On	the	view	we	have	in	mind,	all	inferentially	justified	beliefs	are	justified	in	virtue	of	being	correctly	inferred	from	
noninferentially	justified	beliefs,	and	noninferentially	justified	beliefs	come	in	only	two	varieties	–	beliefs	about	one’s	ongoing	conscious	experience	and	certain	a	priori	beliefs.	Traditionally,	these	foundational	beliefs	were	construed	as	infallible	(BonJour	2001).	Such	foundationalism	has	faced	two	paramount	challenges:	to	show	how	noninferential	justification	is	possible,	and	to	fend	off	challenges	to	the	infallibility	of	beliefs	about	one’s	ongoing	conscious	experience.	Our	discussion	suggests	a	fairly	developed	model	of	the	noninferential	justification	involved	in	phenomenal	beliefs,	thus	potentially	addressing	the	first	challenge.xxiv	As	regards	the	second	challenge,	our	discussion	can	be	seen	as	recommending	moving	away	from	the	claim	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	infallible	to	the	more	modest	claim	that	phenomenal	beliefs	are	the	most	secure	we	have;	this	latter	claim	seems	sufficient	to	justify	treating	them	as	foundational,	especially	given	that	they	are	noninferentially	justified.xxv	
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																																																									i	One	more	specification	is	needed	to	home	in	on	the	beliefs	we	are	interested	in	against	the	background	of	reductive	physicalism.	According	to	reductive	physicalism,	every	phenomenal	property	is	identical	to	some	physical	property.	Wearing	a	top-shelf	cerebroscope	connected	to	an	information	processing	system,	one	might	form	beliefs	about	physical	properties	of	one’s	concurrent	brain	states	that	are	in	fact	phenomenal	properties.	This	kind	of	belief	is	not,	however,	the	kind	of	belief	we	are	interested	in.	So	for	a	reductive	physicalist,	we	propose	that	a	phenomenal	belief	be	construed	as	a	belief	about	the	phenomenal	properties	of	one’s	concurrent	conscious	states	under	a	
phenomenal	description	(or	presented	under	a	phenomenal	mode	of	presentation).	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	we	will	ignore	this	further	specification	in	what	follows.			ii	As	noted,	concept	possession	is	necessary	for	language	expression.	Thus,	what	is	fundamental	to	fact-awareness	is	application	of	concepts	–	enabling	language	expression	is	a	derivative	feature.	However,	stressing	direct	expressibility	helps	to	understand	what	kind	of	concepts	are	deployed	in	fact-awareness.	Dretske	himself	seems	to	suggest	this:	‘Generally	speaking,	the	concepts	necessary	for	awareness	of	facts	are	those	corresponding	to	terms	occurring	obliquely	in	the	clause	(the	that-clause)	describing	the	fact	one	is	aware	of.’	(1993:	265,	fn	8)		iii	It	might	be	argued	that,	in	fact,	thing-awareness	is	directly	expressible	in	public	language:	a	subject	who	has	the	concept	TOAST,	and	is	aware	of	a	toast,	can	directly	express	her	thing-awareness	simply	by	saying	‘toast,’	even	if	she	is	not	aware	of	any	fact	concerning	the	toast.	However,	in	this	case	what	is	directly	expressed	is	not	the	subject’s	thing-awareness	of	the	toast,	but	rather	her	fact-awareness	that	what	she	is	aware	of	is	a	toast	(i.e.,	the	concept	TOAST	applies	to	it).		iv	Here	is	how	Dretske	(1993:	266)	puts	it:	‘Ignorance	of	what	armadillos	are	or	how	they	look	may	prevent	someone	from	being	conscious	of	certain	facts	(that	the	object	crossing	the	road	is	an	armadillo)	without	impairing	in	the	slightest	one’s	awareness	of	the	things	–	the	armadillos	crossing	roads	–	that	(so	to	speak)	constitute	these	facts.’		v	Dretske	himself	is	aware	of	this	possible	objection:	‘One	can,	to	be	sure,	see	armadillos	without	seeing	that	they	are	armadillos,	but	perhaps	one	must,	in	order	to	see	them,	see	that	they	are	(say)	animals	of	some	sort.	[...]	If	this	sounds	implausible	(one	can	surely	mistake	an	animal	for	a	rock	or	a	bush)	maybe	one	must,	in	seeing	an	object,	at	least	see	that	it	is	an	object	of	some	sort.	To	be	aware	of	
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																																																																																																																																																																					a	thing	is	at	least	be	aware	that	it	is...	how	shall	we	say	it?	...	a	thing.	Something	or	other.’	(1993:	268;	italics	original)		vi	Indeed,	Dretske	makes	quite	a	similar	point:	‘It	seems	most	implausible	to	suppose	infants	and	animals	(presumably,	conscious	of	things)	have	concepts	of	this	sort.	If	the	concept	one	must	have	to	be	aware	of	something	is	a	concept	that	applies	to	everything	one	can	be	aware	of,	what	is	the	point	of	insisting	that	one	must	have	it	to	be	aware?’	(1993:	268-269)		vii	A	qua-object	is	distinguished	from	a	property-instance	in	being	a	bona	fide	concrete	particular.	Thus	one	difference	between	the	tree-qua-green	and	the	tree’s	greenness	is	that	you	can	bump	into	the	former	but	not	into	the	latter.	For	the	idea	of	a	qua-object,	see	Fine	1982	(though	the	notion	itself	goes	back	to	Aristotle’s	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	the	man	and	the	musical	man	in	
Physics	I.7).		viii	We	do	recognize	the	measure	of	infelicity	in	the	term	‘thing-introspection.’	What	we	are	introspectively	aware	of	are	clearly	not	‘things’	in	the	ordinary	sense	of	physical	concrete	particulars.	As	we	have	seen	above,	however,	a	‘thing’	in	the	relevant	sense	can	belong	to	any	ontological	category.	This	includes	mental	states,	events,	and	processes,	which	are	the	proper	objects	of	what	we	call	thing-introspection.	If	the	reader	finds	the	label	too	grating,	we	enjoin	her	to	substitute	‘item-introspection’	for	our	‘thing-introspection.’	We	use	the	latter	only	to	underline	the	analogy	with	Dretske’s	distinction.		ix	It	is	worth	noting	the	existence	of	an	intermediary	report	between	‘S	introspects	her	hunger’	and	‘S	introspects	that	she	is	hungry’;	namely,	‘S	introspects	her	hunger	as	a	hunger.’	This	latter	report	is	ostensibly	a	report	of	an	objectual	attitude	but	also	one	of	a	concept-deploying	state.	Accordingly,	we	would	not	admit	it	under	the	rubric	of	thing-introspection	(as	we	use	the	term).	We	are	open	to	two	possibilities.	The	first	is	that	in	addition	to	fact-introspection	and	thing-introspection	there	is	a	third	kind	of	introspection.	The	second	is	that	‘S	introspects	her	hunger	as	hunger’	is	a	misleading	report	of	fact-introspection:	what	it	reports	is	that	S	introspects	that	her	experience	is	a	hunger	experience.			x	Among	them	are	the	argument	from	ineffability	of	conscious	experience	(Schwitzgebel	2008),	the	argument	from	introspective	disagreement	(e.g.,	Bayne	and	Spener	2010),	the	fraternity	initiation	case	(Shoemaker	1996),	and	the	dental	drilling	case	(Rosenthal	2005).	Some	of	them	are	analyzed	in	Giustina	(2015),	and	replied	to	in	terms	of	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction.	As	noted,	we	cannot	go	through	all	of	them	here;	we	plan	to	address	them,	using	the	thing-introspection/fact-introspection	distinction,	in	future	work.		xi	On	a	natural	model,	a	propositional	content	such	as	<I	am	hungry>	involves	as	constituents	(i)	the	concept	of	hunger,	(ii)	the	indexical	I-concept,	and	(iii)	a	predicative	link	between	these	two	(whatever	that	amounts	to).	Since	(i)	is	a	constituent	of	the	propositional	content,	it	is	impossible	to	entertain	the	content	without	possessing	and	applying	the	concept	of	hunger.		xii	We	do	not	mean	to	commit	here	to	the	substantive	possibility	of	instantaneous	concept	application.	Perhaps	the	process	running	from	an	experiential	state	to	the	application	of	a	concept	to	that	state	must	take	some	time,	even	if	it	is	automatic.	Our	present	point	is	just	that	our	account	can	accommodate	both	options.		xiii	Thanks	to	Josh	Weisberg	for	this	example.		xiv	You	might	apply	the	concept(s)	DISGUSTING	VISCOUS	EXPERIENCE,	but	this	is	not	a	particularly	gustatory	set	of	concepts:	DISGUSTING	is	rather	an	aesthetic	concept,	VISCOUS	is	rather	a	tactile	concept,	and	EXPERIENCE	is	more	generic	than	gustatory	concepts.			
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																																																																																																																																																																					xv	From	this	perspective,	when	one	mistakenly	fact-introspects	that	one’s	experience	is	such-and-such,	there	is	a	sense	in	which	the	mistake	is	actually	not	one	of	introspection	proper,	but	of	some	downstream	processes.	Imagine	a	patient	whose	eyesight	is	irreproachable,	but	who,	due	to	brain	lesion,	routinely	misapplies	shape	concepts	to	what	she	sees.	As	a	result,	she	seems	to	see	that	the	building	is	square	when	in	fact	it	is	rectangular,	seems	to	see	that	the	stop	sign	is	round	when	in	fact	it	is	octagonal,	and	so	on.	This	patient’s	perceptual	fact-awareness	is	defective,	leading	to	a	preponderance	of	nonveridical	visual	judgments.	And	yet	there	is	a	sense	in	which	vision	proper	is	perfectly	reliable	in	her	–	there	is	nothing	wrong	with	her	eyesight.	It	is	not	clear	to	us	that	fact-introspection	is	as	unreliable	as	it	is	often	claimed	to	be	(Giustina	2015),	but	even	where	it	proves	untrustworthy,	we	maintain	that	the	situation	resembles	that	of	the	above	patient:	introspection	
proper	is	perfectly	reliable,	and	it	is	only	the	downstream	processing	of	introspective	information	that	is	defective.		xvi	We	suppress	here	a	modal	operator:	clearly,	Dretske	can	allow	that	some	conscious	states	are	such	that	their	subject	is	aware	of	them,	Rosenthal	can	allow	that	some	are	such	that	in	virtue	of	being	in	them	we	are	conscious	of	something	else,	and	so	on.	But	what	they	will	deny	is	the	necessity	of	the	presence	of	such	consciousness-of	(in	Dretske’s	case)	or	consciousness-with	(in	Rosenthal’s).		xvii	Might	the	two	come	apart?	There	is	no	reason	why	not.	Consider	the	following	variation	on	the	inverted	spectrum	thought-experiment.	Imagine	two	subjects	whose	spectra	are	not	inverted	but	whose	inner	awareness	is	‘inverted’:	looking	at	a	red	strawberry,	both	enter	a	visual	state	that	represents	the	strawberry	as	red,	but	one’s	inner	awareness	represents	her	visual	state	as	phenomenally	red	while	the	other’s	represents	hers	as	phenomenally	green.	According	to	the	first	version	of	self-representationalism,	the	conscious	state	is	phenomenally	red	but	happens	to	misrepresent	itself.	According	to	the	second	version,	the	conscious	state	is	phenomenally	green,	because	all	there	is	to	a	conscious	state	being	phenomenally	green	is	that	it	represents	itself	as	so.			xviii	Rosenthal	himself	does	not	seem	to	recognize	thing-introspection	in	his	account	of	introspection.	But	a	higher-order	theorist	could,	in	principle,	make	room	for	it.	This	is	especially	feasible	for	a	higher-order	perception	rather	than	higher-order	thought	theorist	(Lycan	1996).		xix	For	a	similar	consideration	see,	e.g.,	Brentano	1874:	121-6.		xx	One	might	object	that	second-order	states	must	be	posited	anyway:	for	example,	we	can	have	beliefs	about	beliefs.	However,	there	is	a	considerable	asymmetry	between	the	two-state	model	and	the	case	of	a	belief	about	a	belief.	In	the	former	case	a	new	kind	of	state	is	introduced	(namely,	the	introspective	second-order	state);	in	the	latter	the	second-order	state	is	not	of	a	new	kind	(it	is	just	another	belief).		xxi	One	might	wonder	how	thing-introspection	is	built	into	the	introspected	state,	and	constitutive	of	its	phenomenal	properties,	given	that	it	requires	additional	attention	resources.	It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	thing-introspection	is	inbuilt	and	constitutive	of	the	introspected	state	as	thing-introspected	–	as	opposed	to	the	relevant	conscious	state	as	non-thing-introspected,	namely,	simply	as	conscious.	The	additional	attention	involved	in	thing-introspection	contributes	to	determine	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	thing-introspected	state.	Therefore,	for	any	conscious	state	C,	the	phenomenal	character	of	C	as	thing-introspected	might	be	different	from	that	of	C	as	non-thing-introspected.		xxii	A	completely	different	but	coherent	view	in	this	area	is	that	fact-awareness	and	belief	are	in	reality	two	different	descriptions	of	one	and	the	same	state	–	perceiving	that	the	table	is	brown	just	is	believing	that	the	table	is	brown.	(Dretske	himself	often	sounds	like	that.)	We	set	aside	this	view	for	purely	strategic	reasons:	we	indulge	our	opponent’s	supposition	that	an	extra	step	is	needed	here	in	order	to	form	phenomenal	beliefs,	and	show	that	even	so,	phenomenal	beliefs	are	on	the	whole	justified.		
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																																																																																																																																																																					xxiii	In	addition,	there	may	be	a	small	subset	of	phenomenal	beliefs	that	are	infallible,	namely,	phenomenal	beliefs	with	the	content	<this	is	like	that>.	Whether	this	is	so	will	depend	on	whether	it	is	possible	to	endorse	a	fact-introspective	state	with	that	content	without	introducing	the	possibility	of	error	–	something	we	have	not	discussed	here.		xxiv	Obviously,	many	challenges	would	have	to	be	faced	up	to	before	this	account	can	be	taken	to	be	complete.	For	example,	we	have	said	nothing	here	about	how	we	might	address	the	problem	of	‘myth	of	the	given’	(Sellars	1956),	that	is,	the	problem	surrounding	how	a	non-conceptual	state	could	justify	a	conceptual	one,	or	even	enter	the	so-called	space	of	reasons.		xxv	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	we	are	grateful	to	Jonathan	Farrell,	Brie	Gertler,	and	Tom	McClelland.	We	have	also	benefited	from	a	presentation	at	Taiwan	Medical	University;	we	are	grateful	to	the	audience	there,	in	particular	Alex	Byrne,	Austen	Clark,	Sam	Coleman,	and	Kevin	Kimble.		
